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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
RACHEL ARMELINDA CINTRON,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
Case No. 16440
vs.
ELMA J. MILKOVICH,
)

Defendant and
Appellant.

)

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action to recover monetary damages for
injuries sustained as a result of a two vehicle collision which
occurred on February 14, 1976, in Midvale at the intersection of
Allen and Center Streets.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
This personal injury case was tried to a jury before The
Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Third Judicial District Court Judge.
The jury returned a special verdict which found that the
defendant, Elma J. Milkovich, failed to keep a proper lookout and
failed to yield the right of way to the plaintiff, Rachel Cintron
Dcyle.

The jury also found that the plaintiff did keep a proper

lookout.

However, they found she failed to keep her vehicle under

reasonably safe and proper control and drove at a speed that was
not safe, reasonable and prudent under the circumstances.

-1-
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Based on those findings, the jury apportioned betw'
the parties the negligent conduct which proximately caused t
collision. They found the defendant sixty per cent (60%)

ne~

and the plaintiff forty per cent (40%) negligent.

The defendant made a motion for a new trial which;
denied.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The plaintiff-respondent seeks affirmation of the
Judgment of the lower Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appellant's statement of facts is basically
however, it discusses at great length testimony not
this appeal.

Therefore, the respondent submits this

co~

pertin~

stat~~

facts.
On February 14, 1976, at approximately 5:00 p.m.,
plaintiff-respondent, (hereinafter referred to as plaintiff)
sister, and a friend Lonnie were westbound on Cenrer Street
Murray, Utah (TR45).

Center Street is a four-lane dividedh

with separate left-hand turn lanes (see Exhibit 1-D, 3-P a~
The occupants of the vehicle driven by plaintiff were return
home from shopping (TR45).

Defendant-appellant, (hereinafte

referred to as defendant), was making a left-hand turn from
northbound Allen Street to westbound Center Street at the ti
the collision (TR86 and Exhibit 1-D).

This intersection is
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controlled by two stop signs which control the traffic utilizing
Allen Street. (Exhibit 1-D and 2-P.)
Defendant testified that she had accelerated away from
the stop sign to an approximate speed of 10 miles per hour at the
point of impact (TR78).

Regardless of whether defendant stopped

or not, plaintiff began to apply her brakes when she saw defendant
leave the stop sign area and began to pull in front of plaintiff
(TR4 7) .
Plaintiff stated that after defendant pulled away from
the stop sign and began to pull onto Center Street, that she still
thought defendant would stop and allow plaintiff to pass before
pulling into the westbound traffic.

When it was apparent that

defendant was not stopping, plaintiff took her foot off of the
brakes turning her wheel to the right in an attempt to avoid the
collision (TR47).
The visibility is quite unobstructed from the stop sign
through the Rio Grande underpass (TR40, 60 and Exhibit 5-P).
As plaintiff swerved to avoid defendant's car, the left
rear portion of the car driven by plaintiff came in contact with
the left rear portion of defendant's car.

Then plaintiff's car

proceeded up over a curb and across a snow covered lawn before
coming to rest (TR47).
Plaintiff was injured in this accident requiring surgery
(TRSl).

Plaintiff incurred medical expenses and loss of income as

- 3-
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•

a result of the impact (TR52, 53 54, 55).
This appeal centers on the speed and location of

e

vehicles and the duties of the drivers of these vehicles undi
circumstances.

The testimony as to the speed of the plaint!:

vehicle ranges between 30 and 40 miles per hour (TR46, 60,
The posted speed limit was 35 miles per hour.

s

Plaintiff tes:

that she accelerated to maintain her speed coming up the hiL
that she accelerated the speed of her automobile as

inferr~

defendant (TR59).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE QUESTION OF PLAINTIFF'S VEHICLE
CONSTITUTING AN "IMMFDIATE HAZARD"
WITHIN THE MEP.NING OF SECTION 41-6-72.10
(2) UTAH COPE ANNOTATED (1953) IS A
QUESTION OF FACT, TO BE DETERMINED BY
THE JURY.
Section 41-6-72.10(2) Utah Code Annotated (1953) r
a driver stopped at a stop sign to "yield the right of way"•
follows:
(1)
Preferential right of way may be indicated
by stop signs or yield signs as authorized in
section 41-6-99.
(2) Except when directed to proceed by a police
office~, every driver of a vehicle approaching
the stop sign shall stop at a clearly marked
stop line, but if none, before entering the
crosswalk on the near side of the intersection,
or if none, then at a point nearest the intersecti:
roadway where the driver has a view of approachini
traffic on the intersecting roadway before
entering it. After having stopped, the driver
shall yield the right of way to any vehicle in
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the intersection or approaching on another
roadway so closely as to constitute an immediate
hazard during the time when such driver is
moving across or within the intersection or
junction of roadways.
This state requires that the defendant yield the right
of way to the plaintiff's vehicle if it constituted an "immediate
hazard" to the defendant's vehicle at the time the defendant's
vehicle was within the intersection.

In its special verdict, the

jury concluded that defendant was negligent in that she failed to
keep a proper lookout and did not yield the right of way to
plaintiff's vehicle. Defendant contends that plaintiff's vehicle
was not an 'immediate hazard' and that, therefore, defendant
could not be guilty of failing to yield the right of way to
plaintiff.

This position is untenable because the question of

whether or not plaintiff's vehicle constituted an "immediate
hazard" is one of fact, and therefore, a matter to be decided by
the jury.
The court gave the following jury instructions on
"immediate hazard":
INSTRUCTION NO. 21
You are instructed that at an intersection where a
stop sign is erected at one or more entrances
thereto, the driver of a vehicle facing said
stop sign is required to stop in obedience thereto
and yield the right of way to vehicles not so
obliged to stop, which are within the interse~tion
or approaching so closely thereto as to constitute
an immediate hazard; but, said driver having so
yielded may then proceed and the drivers of all
other vehicles approaching the intersection on
said through highway shall yield the right of way
to the vehicle so proceeding into or across the
through highway.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 22
You are instructed that an immediate hazard
exists whenever a reasonably prudent person
having stopped at the entrance to a through
highway in obedience to a stop sign, would
apprehend the probability of colliding with
an oncoming vehicle on the through highway
were he then to attempt crossing the said
through highway.
The jury heard testimony that the defendant when
stopped at the stop sign could see to the bottom of the

ar

hi~

under the underpass (TR40). They also heard testimony that,,
the time defendant pulled away from the stop signn the

plai~

should have been quite visible to defendant since plaintiff'
no trouble observing defendant during this same period (TR4o,
4 7) .

In Hughes v. Hooper, 431 P.2d 983, 984 (1967), thi'
court held:
"The rights and duties of drivers approaching
intersections are questions dealing with the
standard of conduct to be expected of a reasonably prudent man and are peculiarly a matter
for the jury. Contributory negligence is therefon
primarily to be resolved by the trier of facts
since it involves these same rights and duties.
It is not to be treated as one of law unless
the facts and inferences from them are free
from doubt. If there is doubt, the issue is for
the jury."
Similarly, whether defendant was negligent in fail:
to yield the right of way to plaintiff and whether the

pla~

vehicle constituted an "immediate hazard" involve these same
rights and duties.

There is evidence supporting the plainti:

view of the occurrence as well as that of the defendant.

W

was doubt as to the facts and the issue was properly sub~W
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the jury which found these facts to favor the plaintiff.
A very similar factual case, Johnson v. Cornwall
Warehouse Company , 15 U.2d 172, 175, 389 P.2d 710 (1964),
involved a defendant's vehicle making a left hand turn from a
stop sign into the path of the plaintiff's vehicle.

This court

stated:
"In view of the discrepancies in the evidence as to how
far west of the intersection plaintiff's car was at the
time defendant driver entered the intersection, it was
a fact which the jury should have determined whether
defendant driver proceeded into the intersection without keeping a proper lookout and at a time it was not
safe to enter."
It is the duty of this court to view the evidence in a light
most favorable to plaintiff.

(See Johnson v. Cornwall, supra.,

Seegmiller v. Western Men, Inc., 20 U.2d 352, 437 P.2d 892 {1968)).
There is evidence in the record to support the finding that
plaintiff was an "immediate hazard."

The jury's finding of facts

should not be overturned simply because there was conflicting
testimony.
In Marsh v. Irvine, 449 P.2d 996, 22 Utah 2d 154,157 (1969)
which also involved an automobile collision, this court said:
"We agree that the jury should not be allowed
such unbridled license as to base its verdict
upon something which would be a physical impossibility. But .... that does not appear to be the
situation here. It was the jury's prerogative
to choose the evidence they would believe and
to place whatever emphasis and draw what~ver
reasonable inferences therefrom they desired
so long as they were not wholly inconsistent
with reason."
The jury's verdict is not inconsistent with reason and

t
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is not based upon something constituting a physical impossij
There is more than sufficient evidence in the record as to
and location of vehicles to support the jury's special verd:
The jury exercised its prerogative to choose the evidence it
believe and to place whatever emphasis and draw whatever re,
able inference therefrom it desired.

Its decision was thu

plaintiff's claim had the support of the preponderance

of~

evidence.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT ERROR IN
REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY AS
TO THE SUBSTANCE OF A MUNICIPAL
ORDINANCE. THE DUTY IMPOSED BY
THIS ORDINANCE WAS ADEQUATELY
COVERED IN THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS.
The defendant requested the following

instructi~

uested jury instruction no. 18):
"Under the ordinance of Midvale City, it is
provided that the driver of any vehicle
traveling at an unlawful speed shall forfeit
any right of way he might otherwise have.
If, therefore, you find from the evidence
in this case that the plaintiff's vehicle
was being driven at an unlawful speed, then
I instruct you that the right of way which
she might otherwise have had at such intersection would be forfeited."
It is the duty of the trial judge to determine whi
requested jury instructions are applicable to the case.
Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 51.

mi

A requested instructionni

not be given if the substance of the requested instruction~
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otherwise covered by the instructions given.
In Hardman v. Thurman, 121 Utah 143, 239 P.2d 215 (1951),
the defendants claimed that the trial court erred in not giving
certain instructions which correctly stated the law.

This court

found the refusal to instruct the jury not to be prejudicial
error, stating:
"Defendant's final contention is that the court
erred in not giving certain instructions requested by the defendants. We have carefully
compared the requested instructions and the
instructions given by the court and while it
must be conceded that several of the requests
denied correctly stated the law, nevertheless
the substance thereof was given in the instructions of the court. Hence it was not error to
to refuse the request of defendant. The court
adequately instructed the jury on all matters so
as to correctly present the defendant's theory
of the case. We find no prejudicial error.
239 P.2d at 219.
Similar results have been reached in Muir v. Christensen,
15 U.2d 182, 389 P.2d 734 (1964); McMurdie v. Underwood, 9 U.2d
400, 346 P.2d 711 (1959); and Lee v. Howes, 548 P.2d 619 (Utah
1976). In these cases the jury was sufficiently schooled in the
applicable law to make a determination of the comparative negligence of each party.

The cases held that a refusal to give requested

instructions was not error when, "the basic issues were fairly and
intelligibly presented to the jury for its determination."

9 U.2d

at 405.
The defendant's requested instruction no. 18 originates
from a Midvale City Ordinance valid at the time of the accident
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but later repealed.

Assuming, arguendo, that the requested

tion correctly states the law, the trial court did not error
refusing to give this instruction.

The substance of the iru

was otherwise given to the jury.
The jury was instructed as to the applicable
the duties of each driver.

l~r

These instructions, taken as

cover the substance of the defendant's requested

a~

instructi~

18. This instruction deals with the duty of the plaintiff wi:
regard to speed and right of way.

It is apparent from

the~

verdict of the jury that the jury considered these factors i:
assessing the forty per cent comparative negligence against·
plaintiff.
POINT III.
THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL
WAS NOT PREJUDICED BY THE COURT'S
EXAMINATION OF PLAINTIFF'S WITNESSES.
During the course of the trial, the trial judge ex,
some of the plaintiff's as well as some of the

defendant's~

nesses. This examination did not result in the defendant bei'
denied a fair trial as asserted by the defendant.
The defendant, in her brief, wishes to count

the~

of questions asked of the plaintiff's witnesses and of the~
dant's witnesses and to equate the number of questions as~i
prejudice.

The defendant does not specify which particulu

or questions tendered by the court caused the alleged prej~
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the fair trial.
The questions asked by the court were intended to clarify
testimony already given or requested.

Defense counsel concurred

that particular questions should be asked (TR8).

The appendix to

the defendant's brief which includes the questioning alleged to be
improper deletes lines 13 and 14 of page 8 of the transcript.
Also, the questions asked by the court aided in the presentation
of the defense case (TRlO, Line 18 et.seq.).
The plaintiff concurs with the defendant that State v.
Mellen, 583 P. Zd 46 (Utah 1978) correctly states the law as so the
judge's authority to examine witnesses.

The court stated:

"[The] judge should and normally does exercise
restraint in examining witnesses, so that he
does not unduly intrude into the trial or encroach
upon the function of counsel .... Notwithstanding
what has just been said, the judge does have a
function beyond sitting as a comparatively
silent monitor of proceedings. In order to
discharge his responsibility of carrying out
the above stated objective, it is within his
prerogative to ask whatever questions of witnesses as in his judgment [are] necessary or
desirable to clarify, explain or add to the
evidence as it relates to disputea-Tssues.
583 p. Zd at 48. [Emphasis that of the defendant].
The defendant does not point out how the questions of
the court went beyond clarification, explanation or addition to
the evidence as it related to disputed issues.

Therefore, the

trial judge correctly exercised his discretion in his examination
of witnesses.

This examination was not error nor was it prejudicial

to the defendant.
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CONCLUSION
The plaintiff's vehicle was an "immediate hazard"
within the meaning of Utah Code Annotated Section 41-6-72.H
evidence did raise some conflict as to the location of

the~

The court correctly submitted these issues to the jury forf
decision.
There is no basis for defendant to claim error bee
the proper jury instruction no. 18 was not given.

It is the

of the trial judge to make a determination of the applicabiL
and the necessity for that instruction.

The underlying basi'

that jury instruction was amply given in the other instructii
the jury.

The basic issues of this case were fairly and int

presented to the jury for its determination.
A judge should exercise restraint in examining
so that he does not unduly intrude into the function of

~t
co~

This is something that must be determined by the circumstuu
some cases will require more questions by the trial judge
others.

~

It is not only the trial judge's prerogative but a1'

function, to ask questions of witnesses which he, in his fa:
feels necessary or desirable to clarify, explain or add tot
evidence as it relates to any of the disputed issues.
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the
lower court should be affirmed.

-12-
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judgme~~

DATED this 29th day of November, 1979.
Respectfully submitted,
HANSON, RUSSON, HANSON

&DUNN

MAILING CERTIFICATE
Mailed two copies of the foregoing Respondent's Brief
to L. L. Summerhays, of Strong

&Hanni,

Attorneys for Defendant/

Appellant, 604 Boston Building, Salt Lake City, Utah

84111, this

30th day of November, 1979.
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